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I. INTRODUCTION
The sovereign immunity doctrine has been an accepted principle of
international law for centuries, allowing governments and their agents to
escape prosecution in foreign courts.1 Over time, however, the doctrine's
parameters have expanded greatly. Dissatisfied with this expansion, na-
tions have adopted statutes that restrict sovereign immunity.2 The prin-
1. Sovereign immunity permits a government and its agents to claim immunity from
prosecution in the courts of other nations. As a result, a sovereign cannot be a party unless it
voluntarily submits to the jurisdiction of the court. The doctrine upholds the principle of
"perfect equality and absolute independence of sovereigns." In the interests of comity and the
promotion of relations among nations, the doctrine restricts a court's sovereignty in its own
territory which would otherwise be "necessarily exclusive and absolute." Schooner Exchange
v. M'Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136 (1812). The doctrine is also based on fairness
toward sovereigns who might not be familiar with domestic laws and who might not be treated
equally by local courts. See generally, Varges, Defining a Sovereign for Immunity Purposes:
Proposals to Amend the International Law Association Draft Convention, 26 HARV. INT'L L.J.
103 (1985). The origins of the doctrine are unclear. Some trace it to medieval domestic doc-
trines of "the King can do no wrong" and "the sovereign cannot be a defendant in its own
courts." Comment, Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976-Judicial Predominance, 4
BROOKLYN J. INT'L LAW 146, 147 (1977). Others trace sovereign immunity to Roman legal
concepts such as "equals do not have jurisdiction of each other." Id. Still others trace the
concept to diplomatic immunity. M. BRIGGS, THE LAW OF NATIONS 442-51 (1952); J.
BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 243-67 (1963); H. KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 235 (1952); Schmitthoff & Wooldridge, The Nineteenth Century Doctrine of Sov-
ereign Immunity and the Importance of the Growth of State Trading, 2 DEN. J. INT'L L. &
POL'Y 199 (1972).
2. Currently, restrictive sovereign immunity is being applied with increasing frequency
to various governmental activities throughout the world. Note, CommercialActivity Under the
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ciple of restrictive immunity gives immunity to a state for its public acts
(fure imperii), but not for its private acts (fure gestionis).'
In an effort to adopt a restrictive sovereign immunity policy, the
United States enacted the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) in
1976.1 The FSIA established an exclusive standard for the judiciary to
use in determining the applicability of sovereign immunity,' which was
to depoliticize the judicial decisionmaking process. 6
The FSIA provides several important exceptions under which a for-
eign sovereign can be denied immunity.7 This Note explores two of these
exceptions: the commercial activity exception8 and the noncommercial
tort exception.9 The noncommercial tort exception provides that a for-
eign sovereign may be held liable for certain torts committed in the
United States or for torts which cause an effect in the United States.'0
The more controversial exception, however, is the commercial activity
exception. It denies a foreign sovereign immunity if the sovereign en-
gages in nongovernmental, commercial acts which create sufficient con-
tacts with the United States to meet constitutional due process
requirements. I
Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976: Toward a More Practical Definition, 34 BAYLOR L. REv.
295, 296 (1982); H. R. REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1976) [hereinafter House
Report].
3. Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Advisor to the Department of State, to the
Acting Attorney General Perlman, 26 Dep't St. Bull. 984 (May 1952) [hereinafter Tate Letter].
4. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, Pub. L. No. 94-583, U.S. CODE CONG & ADMIN.
NEws (90 Stat.) 2891 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332(a)(2), 1391(f), 1441(a), 1602-1611).
5. House Report, supra note 2, at 12.
6. Id. at 7-12. Congress sought to reduce the foreign policy implications which result
from judicial determinations of sovereign immunity. Id.
7. 28 U.S.C. § 1605. These exceptions involve: 1) waivers of immunity, 2) certain for-
eign expropriation claims, 3) property rights located in the United States, and 4) specific claims
in admiralty. Id.
8. Id. § 1605(a)(5).
9. Id. § 1605(a)(5).
10. Id. § 1605(a)(5).
11. The due process requirements are addressed in 28 U.S.C. § 1330. Section 2 of the
FSIA sets out a comprehensive jurisdictional scheme for cases involving foreign states. It
provides the United States district courts with subject matter and personal jurisdiction over
foreign states and their political subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities. The drafters give
broad jurisdiction to the federal courts in order to increase uniformity in court's decisions.
Uniformity is desirable because disparate treatment of foreign nations under the FSIA could
adversely affect foreign relations. House Report, supra note 2, at 12-13. Specifically, § 1330(a)
addresses subject matter jurisdiction. It provides federal district courts with original jurisdic-
tion over in personam cases against foreign states. The jurisdiction extends to any claim in
which a foreign nation is not entitled to immunity under §§ 1605-1607, or under any applica-
ble international agreement of the type contemplated by § 1604. Id. at 13. Moreover, to allow
actions against foreign states in federal court, jurisdictional requirements are relaxed and sub-
ject matter jurisdiction is permitted without regard to the amount in controversy. A district
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The scope of these two exceptions has been an area of considerable
debate. The debate is attributed largely to the broad definitions stated in
the FSIA.12 United States courts have developed various tests to deter-
mine when these statutory exceptions apply.13 These tests have been ap-
plied with varying degrees of success.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in De Sanchez v. Banco Central
de Nicaragua recently announced new tests to determine the application
of both exceptions. 4 Applying the new tests, the court found the plain-
tiff's claims did not fall within either the commercial activity exception
or the noncommercial tort exception to the FSIA.15 The Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals ruled that a plaintiff cannot maintain an action against
a foreign bank for conversion of intangible property under the noncom-
mercial tort exception. 6 The court's application of the commercial ac-
tivity exception effectively created such a broad definition of
governmental activity that virtually any activity which has an indirect
effect on the government easily could be classified as governmental.
This Note will analyze the commercial activity and the noncommer-
cial tort exceptions and how they have been broadly interpreted by vari-
court decision dismissing a suit for lack of jurisdiction is dipositive of the issue of sovereign
immunity. Such a decision means that the foreign state is entitled to sovereign immunity.
Thus, a private party whose suit was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction is barred from bringing
the same action in a state court, and cannot claim that the federal court's decision extended
only to the issue of federal jurisdiction and not to sovereign immunity. Id. Section 1330(b)
enumerates the requirements for personal jurisdiction. The action must be one over which the
district court has original jurisdiction under § 1330(a); that is, an action which does not entitle
the foreign nation to immunity. Section 1330(b) is the federal long-arm statute which allows
jurisdiction over foreign nations, including their political subdivisions, agencies, and instru-
mentalities. To meet due process restraints the section sets forth requirements of minimum
jurisdictional contacts and adequate notice. The immunity provisions of the FSIA, 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1605-1607, however, require only a connection between the claim and the United States, or
an express or implied waiver of the foreign state's immunity from jurisdiction. Thus, the im-
munity provisions prescribe the necessary contacts which must exist before United States
courts could exercise personal jurisdiction.
12. Section 1603(d) of the FSIA defines commercial activity as follows: "A commercial
activity means either a regular course of commercial conduct or a particular commercial trans-
action or act. The commercial character of an activity shall be determined by reference to the
nature of the course of conduct or particular transaction or act, rather than by reference to its
purpose."
13. See Von Mehren, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 17 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 33, 48-58 (1978); Kahale & Vega, Immunity and Jurisdiction: Toward a Uni-
form Body of Law in Actions Against Foreign States, 18 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 211, 236-44
(1979); Brower, Bistline & Loomis, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 in Practice,
73 AM. J. INT'L L. 200, 204-08 (1979).
14. 770 F.2d 1385 (5th Cir. 1985).
15. Id. at 1395-99.
16. Id. at 1399.
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ous courts. This Note first will trace the development of the foreign
sovereign immunity doctrine and will examine the events preceeding the
enactment of the FSIA. Next, judicial interpretations of the FSIA and
its exceptions will be discussed and the relationship between the excep-
tions will be explored. The effect of the De Sanchez decision on previous
cases and as precedent for future decisions will be examined. Finally,
this Note will criticize the courts' interpretations and application of the
exceptions and will discuss the various implications of the courts' reason-
ing. Suggestions to limit the effect of the courts' interpretations of the
commercial activity and the noncommercial tort exceptions will be
provided.
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOVEREIGN
IMMUNITY DOCTRINE
A. Absolute Theory of Sovereign Immunity
Sovereign immunity is a principle of international law which pro-
vides that domestic courts must in certain circumstances relinquish juris-
diction when a party to the suit is a foreign sovereign. 7 Initially, courts
interpreted sovereign immunity to furnish absolute immunity to a foreign
sovereign regardless of its activities.18 In the United States, this principle
first was espoused by Justice Marshall in Schooner Exchange v.
M'Faddon.19 In M'Faddon, two Americans attempted to attach a
French warship that had sailed into a United States port and had docked
for repairs. Justice Marshall, writing for the Supreme Court, found that
sovereign immunity prohibited the exercise of jurisdiction over the vessel:
This full and absolute territorial jurisdiction being alike the attri-
bute of every sovereign and being capable of conferring extra-territo-
rial powers, would not seem to contemplate foreign sovereigns nor
their sovereign rights as its objects. One sovereign being in no respect
amenable to another; and being bound by obligations of the highest
character not to degrade the dignity of his nation by placing himself or
its sovereign rights within the jurisdiction of another, can be supposed
to enter a foreign territory only under an express license, or in the
confidence that the immunities belonging to his independent sovereign
station, though not expressely stipulated, are reserved by implication
17. See supra note I for a definition of sovereign immunity and for a general overview of
the concept.
18. See generally Note, Foreign Sovereign Immunity and CommercialActivity: A Conflicts
Approach, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1440 (1983); Hill, A Policy Analysis of the American Law of
Foreign State Immunity, 50 FORDHAM L. REV. 155 (1981).
19. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116.
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and will be extended to him.20
The Supreme Court expanded the theory of absolute immunity in
1926, in Berizzi Bros. Co. v. S.S. Pesaro,21 holding that a nation could
invoke sovereign immunity irrespective of the nature of its activities. In
that case, the Court provided foreign commercial ships with the sover-
eign immunity traditionally accorded military vessels because "all ships
held and used by a government ... for the purpose of advancing the
trade of its people or providing reserve for its treasury ... are public
ships in the same sense that warships are."' 22 The Court thereby ex-
tended sovereign immunity to encompass a nation's commercial as well
as governmental activities.
In subsequent years, United States courts became increasingly dis-
satisfied with the principle of absolute sovereign immunity.23 The re-
peated application of the principle to explosive growth in foreign
sovereign governmental activities produced inequitable results.24 Specifi-
cally, application of the absolute sovereign immunity doctrine deprived
private citizens conducting business with foreign governments of a legal
remedy in any court.25 Further, the Supreme Court was concerned that
granting absolute immunity to sovereigns gave foreign nations a commer-
cial advantage in the market over private firms not so privileged, espe-
cially because governments began to rely increasingly upon sovereign
immunity to avoid commercial commitments.2 6 These concerns and in-
equities led to the development of restrictive sovereign immunity.27
B. Restrictive Sovereign Immunity
Although absolute sovereign immunity has no exceptions, restrictive
sovereign immunity provides immunity only for govermental acts. Thus,
commercial and private activities are outside the ambit of restrictive sov-
ereign immunity.28 Any business person who engages in commercial ac-
20. Id. at 137.
21. 271 U.S. 562 (1926).
22. Id. at 563.
23. In the twentieth century, as the volume of international trade increased, dissatisfac-
tion with absolute sovereign immunity was reflected in judicial decisions. Schmitthotf & Wool-
dridge, supra note 1, at 200.
24. Note, supra note 2, at 295-96.
25. Note, supra note 18, at 1452; McCormick, The CommercialActivity Exception to For-
eign Sovereign Immunity and the Act of State Doctrine, 16 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 477, 484
(1984).
26. Note, supra note 18, at 1452. See also The Pesaro, 277 F. 473, 481 (S.D.N.Y. 1921).
27. Note, supra note 2, at 296; House Report, supra note 2, at 8.
28. Tate Letter, supra note 3; Alfred Dunhill, Inc. v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976).
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tivity with a foreign government should have a remedy available if that
goverment acts in a wrongful manner. Only when a foreign government
is acting in its sovereign capacity should it be accorded sovereign
immunity.29
In 1952 the State Department announced its restrictive sovereign
immunity policy in the "Tate Letter."30 The Tate Letter responded to
the widespread and increasing commercial activities conducted by for-
eign governments. The State Department's new policy accorded foreign
sovereigns immunity for claims resulting from sovereign or public acts,
but refused immunity for claims arising from private or commercial ac-
tivities.31 Despite the Tate Letter directives, application of restrictive
sovereign immunity posed many problems. The lack of adequate guide-
lines for the application of the restrictive interpretation, coupled with the
absence of a clear definition of what constituted "commercial" as op-
posed to "governmental" acts, led to the development of a variety of
tests, each producing different results.32
The "purpose of the act" test was an early test developed to catego-
rize an activity as either commercial or governmental.33 Under this test,
acts were classified as sovereign only if they had a public purpose.34 The
application of this test produced difficulties because the test required a
determination of each nation's attitude toward trade. Judges exercised
discretion to characterize activities as sovereign or nonsovereign accord-
ing to their view of "the proper realm of state functioning."35 In the
nations which viewed foreign trade as a sovereign activity, all sovereign
acts were construed as having a public purpose.3 6 The application of the
purpose test analysis never resulted in an activity being characterized as
noncommercial, since a foreign sovereign defendant always pointed to a
public end. Consequently, the purpose test proved to be an inadequate
means of distinguishing commercial from governmental activities.37
29. Note, supra note 18, at 1469; Somarajah, Problems in Applying the Restrictive Theory
of Sovereign Immunity, 31 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 661, 662 (1982).
30. Tate Letter, supra note 3.
31. Id. at 985.
32. See Holmes, Establishing Jurisdiction Under the Commercial Activities Exception to
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 19 Hous. L. REv. 1003, 1005 (1982).
33. Note, supra note 2, at 297.
34. Id.
35. Victory Transport, Inc. v. Comisaria General de Abastecimientos y Transportes, 336
F.2d 354, 359 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 934 (1965).
36. Id. at 359.
37. Recognizing the difficulties inherent in the purpose test, the Second District court in
Victory Transport, 336 F.2d 354, adopted a test which identified five categories of public acts
falling within the definition of sovereign immunity. Categories included internal administra-
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Moreover, the test defeated the aims of restrictive interpretation and led
to the enactment of the FSIA.
In addition to the doctrine of sovereign immunity, the State Depart-
ment continued to intervene in judicial determinations of jurisdiction.38
Since the judiciary would rely upon the State Department's expertise in
foreign affairs, this intervention inhibited the judiciary's development of
consistent case law regarding the application of restrictive foreign sover-
eign immunity in the United States.39 Courts feared that if they errone-
ously applied the sovereign immunity doctrine, they would embarrass the
executive branch.40 Thus, the judiciary applied the sovereign immunity
doctrine on the basis of State Department recommendations, instead of
determining the public versus the private nature of the sovereign's activi-
ties.41 The State Department's recommendations often were contingent
upon the identity and power of the sovereign defendant, and were made
without due consideration of the nature or the purpose of the sovereign's
activity.42 Judicial decisions were influenced so significantly by executive
advice that foreign sovereigns often applied directly to the State Depart-
ment to acquire a grant of immunity.43
The State Department's conduct was criticized. Critics protested
that its secret negotiations and informal hearings on the issue of sover-
eign immunity prior to advising the courts abridged the rights of private
litigants." One such critic, Sigmund Timberg, stated that each time the
State Department issued a "recommendation" of immunity, it deprived a
private litigant of a right or remedy provided by federal or state law.45 In
addition, there were no laws requiring notice to the private litigant that
the State Department was considering a sovereign immunity recommen-
dation. If notice was given, an informal conference would be available to
the private party upon the party's request. The conferences, however,
did not provide the private litigant with an adequate opportunity to con-
tive acts such as nationalization, acts concerning the sovereign's armed forces, acts concerning
diplomatic activity, and public loans. This test predominated until the passage of the FSIA in
1976.
38. Holmes, supra note 32, at 1005; Lowenfeld, Claims Against Foreign States-A Propo-
sal for Reform of United States Law, 44 N.Y.L. REV. 901, 905-13 (1969)
39. Holmes, supra note 32, at 1005; McCormick, supra note 25, at 485-86.
40. McCormick, supra note 25, at 482.
41. Id. at 483-86. See also Note, Sovereign Immunity-Limits of Judicial Control-the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 18 HARV. Irr'L L.J. 429, 435-36 (1977).
42. McCormick, supra note 25, at 483.
43. Id. at 486.
44. Id. at 483-86; Note, supra note 41, at 435-36.
45. Timberg, Wanted: Administrative Safeguards for the Protection of the Individual in
International Economic Regulation, 17 AD. L. REV. 159, 169 (1965).
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front the arguments advanced by the foreign government or to question
the considerations that motivated the Department's recommendation.46
Critics claimed that the State Department's internal methods were defi-
cient because "suggestions of immunity were believed to be issued in ac-
cordance with political expediency regardless of consistency."47
Furthermore, there was no published precedent to guide parties to
challenge a State Department recommendation, because the State De-
partment generally did not specify its rationale for reaching a decision.48
No appellate review process was available within the State Department
or the judiciary to give parties recourse once immunity had been
granted.49 Private parties, therefore, were left immobilized and impotent
in the face of unexplained adverse decisions."0 This state of affairs, along
with problems of enforcing the doctrine of restrictive sovereign immunity
as enunciated in the Tate Letter, contributed to the enactment of the
FSIA in 1976.5"
III. THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES
ACT OF 1976
A. Goals
Congress enacted the FSIA in 1976, to provide U.S. citizens with a
forum in which they would be able to bring suits against foreign na-
tions.5 2 Congress' stated goals were: (a) to codify the principle of restric-
tive sovereign immunity; (b) to ensure that sovereign immunity decisions
were judicial rather than executive; (c) to provide a method for service of
process on foreign state defendants; and, (d) to establish a method for
satisfying in personam judgments. 53 Congress intended the FSIA to pre-
empt all state and federal sovereign immunity laws but not international
46. Id.; See generally Cardozo, Sovereign's Immunity: The Plaintiff Deserves a Day in
Court, 67 HARV. L. REV. 608 (1954); Note, The Sovereign Immunity and Private Property.- A
Due Process Problem, 50 GEO. L.J. 284, 291 (1961).
47. Note, supra note 46, at 292-98; Hill, supra note 18, at 155.
48. Hill, supra note 18, at 155.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Holmes, supra note 32, at 1005; see generally Lowenfeld, supra note 38, at 905-13.
52. 28 U.S.C. § 1605. Holmes, supra note 32, at 1006-07. The House Report on the
FSIA states that a "principle purpose of [the Act] is to transfer the determination of sovereign
immunity from the executive branch to the judicial branch, thereby reducing the foreign policy
implications of immunity determinations and assuring litigants that these often crucial deci-
sions are made on purely legal grounds and under procedures that insure due process." House
Report, supra note 2, at 7.
53. House Report, supra note 2, at 7.
[Vol. 10
Foreign Sovereign Immunities
agreements.5 4 In this way, the Act buttressed the courts' ability to apply
international law domestically.5 The drafters further believed that the
elimination of political influences would enable the courts to establish
clear jurisdictional standards.5 6 These standards would provide notice to
foreign nations doing business with Americans that the nations could be
subject to jurisdiction in United States courts.
B. Exceptions
One of the FSIA's principal goals was to establish restrictive sover-
eign immunity in United States legal practice 7.5  This was, achieved by
codifying a general rule of sovereign immunity subject to express excep-
tions.5 8 The general rule is a presumption that all activities of foreign
states should be protected from litigation because governmental interests
outweigh private ones.5 9 The exceptions, however, represent a set of situ-
ations in which the presumption is rebutted because the private interest
of litigating claims outweighs the governmental interest in protecting its
functions from foreign judicial scrutiny.6" This Note focuses on two of
the codified exceptions: the commercial activity and the noncommercial
tort exceptions.
1. Commercial Activity Exception
Under the commercial activity exception, acts of a sovereign which
are commercial in nature and which create sufficient contacts with the
United States to fulfill constitutional due process jurisdictional require-
ments do not receive immunity under the FSIA.61 The exception pro-
vides that:
54. 28 U.S.C. § 1604. "All immunity provisions in sections 1604 through 1607 are made
subject to existing treaties and other international agreements to which the United States is a
party. In the event an international agreement expressly conflicts with this bill, the interna-
tional agreement would control .. " House Report, supra note 2, at 17.
55. House Report, supra note 2, at 12. Under international law nations are not immune
from the jurisdiction of foreign courts in so far as their commercial activities are concerned.
Sovereign claims of immunity under the Act are decided by courts of the United States and of
the states. House Report, supra note 2.
56. House Report, supra note 2.
57. House Report, supra note 2, at 7.
58. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1604-1605.
59. Hill, supra note 18, at 204.
60. Id. at 204.
61. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2). For constitutional requirements see supra note 11. The com-
mercial activity exception reflects a policy decision that in the business context the private
interest will be considered more significant than the governmental interest, largely because in
business dealings the private party ordinarily has an expectation of judicial recourse. See Hill,
supra note 18, at 205.
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(a) A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of
courts of the United States or of the states in any case:... (2) in which
the action is based upon a commercial activity carried on in the United
States by the foreign state; or upon an act performed in the United
States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state
elsewhere; or upon an act outside the territory of the United States in
connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere
and that act causes a direct effect in the United States.6 2
Thus, to exercise subject matter jurisdiction under this exception, a
court first must find that the activity is commercial. The statute defines a
commercial activity as either a regular course of commercial conduct or
a particular commercial act;63 thus, the commercial character does not
depend upon the activity's purpose.' Once the court determines that the
activity in question is commercial, it must then determine whether the
cause of action bears a connection to the United States as provided for in
the exception.65 If the activity is found to be noncommercial, it satisfies
none of the three clauses of section 1605(a)(2) and the foreign state is
held immune from suit.
2. Noncommercial Tort Exception
The noncommercial tort exception provides that a foreign nation
will not be immune from the jurisdiction of American courts when:
money damages are sought against a foreign state for personal injury
or death or damage to or loss of property, occuring in the United
States and caused by the tortious act or omission of that foreign state
or of any official or employee while acting within the scope of his office
or employment.66
Thus, claims which are based upon the exercise or failure to exercise
a discretionary function will not be within the exception's ambit. 67 It
also provides that claims that arise out of malicious prosecution, abuse of
process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with
contract rights are not covered by the exception. As a result, a for-
eigner's acts which can be the basis of any of these claims are immune.68
62. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2).
63. Id. § 1603(d).
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5).
67. Id.
68. 28 U.S.C. at § 1605(a)(5). Subparagraphs (A) and (B) of the exception reinstate im-
munity when they apply and are similar to provisions of the Federal Tort Claims Act. 28
U.S.C. § 2671-2680 (1976). See House Report, supra note 2, at 21.
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Congress intended this exception to resolve the problem tort victims
often faced in obtaining jurisdiction over foreign states or their agents by
allowing tort victims to sue foreign states in United States courts.69 Be-
cause the exception is expressed in general terms, it applies to all tort
actions for money damages not covered by the commercial activity
exception. 0
IV. ANALYSIS OF JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION
OF THE FSIA
A. Commercial Activity Exception
Under the commercial activity exception a foreign entity is held ac-
countable for its commercial activities. Because Congress left the task of
interpreting many of the Act's terms to the courts, the commercial activ-
ity exception and its terms have been subject to varying interpretations
and inconsistent application.71 The definition of "commercial activity"
has been controversial. Congress attempted to clarify this term by indi-
cating in the Act that activities fell within a spectrum which ranged from
commercial behavior on the one end to governmental activites on the
other.72 A House report stated that commercial activity encompassed a
variety of endeavors from individual transactions to regular commercial
conduct.73 An activity customarily carried on for profit was to be pre-
sumed commercial in nature.74 A regular course of commercial conduct
was thought to include commercial enterprises such as mineral extrac-
tion, airline operation, or state trading.75 A single contract, if of the
same profit-oriented character as a contract which might be made by a
69. House Report, supra note 2, at 21.
70. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5). The commercial exception also does not cover tort actions
such as libel and slander which are expressly excluded by the language of the noncommercial
tort exception.
71. For example, ownership of an apartment building by the East German government
was considered a commercial activity in County Board of Arlington County v. Government of
the German Democratic Republic, No. 78-293-A (E.D. Va. 1978). In contrast, the alleged
libel in Yessenin-Volpin v. Novosti Press Agency, 443 F. Supp. 849 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), was
treated as a governmental rather than a commercial act. In United Euram Corp. v. Union of
Soviet Republics, 461 F. Supp. 609 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), a cultural project of the Soviet govern-
ment to supply performing artists was considered a commercial activity. Id. at 611. In Gittler
v. German Information Center, 408 N.Y.S.2d 600, 601-02 (Sup. Ct. 1978), however, work
performed on the making of films for the German Information Center was held to be a non-
commercial diplomatic activity "in connection with fostering cultural relations and promoting
understanding between Germany and the United States." Id. at 601-02.
72. House Report, supra note 2, at 16-17.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 16.
75. Id.
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private person, was thought to constitute a particular commercial trans-
action or act.76
The FSIA's exceptions superseded the purpose test." The FSIA
adopted a test which looked to the nature of the act to determine whether
an activity was commercial or governmental. 7  The nature of the act
test, however, has proven to be almost as difficult to apply as the purpose
test. Critics of the nature of the act test point out that many activities
which are private in a free market economy are conducted by the govern-
ment in nonmarket economies.79 Thus, the commercial activity excep-
tion may encompass the activities of one country but exclude the same
activities when performed by another country due to the different types
of governments. In Yessenin-Volpin v. Novosti Press Agency,80 for in-
stance, a Soviet dissident plaintiff living in the United States claimed that
two Soviet news agencies distributed defamatory news articles about him.
Plaintiff asserted that the operation of a press agency, which regularly
writes and sells articles, is a commercial activity within the definition of
the FSIA. The court held that regardless of the commercial aspects, the
acts in question were not done "in connection with" a profit-making ac-
tivity, but rather were undertaken in cooperation with the government.81
If the suit had been against another nation the result may have been
different.
In recent years courts have continued to struggle with the definition
of commercial activity and with the exception's application. 2 Courts
have had to determine which activities fit into the three alternate clauses
of the commercial activity exception. These clauses are: (1) commercial
activity "carried on in the United States"; (2) an act within the United
States "in connection with" a commercial activity elsewhere; and (3) an
act outside the United States in connection with a commercial activity
elsewhere which act causes a "direct effect in the United States.' 83
76. Id.
77. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d); Note, supra note 18, at 1480.
78. See supra note 77.
79. Note, "Commercial Activity" in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 14 J.
INT'L & ECON. 163 (1980).
80. 443 F. Supp. 849 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
81. Id. Intragovernmental cooperation refers to the cooperative relationship between pri-
vate agencies and the government. In this case, the intragovernmental cooperation involved
the U.S.S.R., Tass, Novosti (Soviet newspapers) and the Soviet journals in which the articles
were published. Id. at 856.
82. Examples include De Sanchez v. Banco Central de Nicaragua, 770 F.2d 1385 (5th Cir.
1985) and In re Sedco, 543 F. Supp. 561 (S.D. Tex. 1982).
83. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2).
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1. Activity Carried on in the United States
The first clause has been subject to different interpretations. For
example, in Sugarman v. AeroMexico, Inc.84 the court broadly construed
the language of the exception. In Sugarman, an AeroMexico Airlines
passenger was injured while awaiting a delayed flight to New York City
from a Mexican airport.8 5 The passenger sued the state run airline. The
court held that AeroMexico, despite its state run status, was not immune
from suit under the FSIA.86 The court based its decision on several fac-
tors: the airline conducted its operations in the United States as a com-
mon carrier, the plaintiff purchased a round trip ticket to Mexico in New
Jersey, and the events complained of allegedly caused continued physical
suffering and economic loss to the plaintiff after he got back to the
United States.87 Thus, the court denied immunity because much of de-
fendant's commercial activity took place in the United States. 8 The
court did not require that the commercial activity occur in the United
States but rather found it was enough that the acts complained of,
"although themselves extraterritorial, grew out of regular course of com-
mercial conduct carried out in the United States."89
Conversely, in Harris v. VAC Intourist Moscow,9 ° the court narrowly
construed "activity carried on in the United States" to determine that the
court lacked jurisdiction In Harris, the plaintiff brought suit against two
state-owned Russian tourist services and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics to recover damages for the alleged wrongful death of an Amer-
ican tourist in a fire at a Moscow hotel.9 The plaintiff argued that, be-
cause of the integration of the Soviet tourist industry, there was a
relationship between the negligent operation of the Moscow hotel and
any Soviet activity in the United States that related to the hotel. This
relationship, the plaintiff argued, meant that defendant was "doing busi-
ness" in the United States.9" The court, however, decided that the rela-
tionship between the hotel's operation and the defendant's activities in
the United States was too attenuated. Although the Act provides juris-
diction against foreign sovereigns for doing business in the United States,
the Harris claim was not found to be based upon Soviet commercial ac-
84. 626 F.2d 270 (3d Cir. 1980).
85. Id.
86. Id. at 275.
87. Id. at 270.
88. Id. at 273.
89. Id.
90. 481 F. Supp. 1056 (E.D.N.Y. 1979).
91. Id. at 1056-57.
92. Id. at 1057-59.
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tivity in the United States.93 The Harris and Sugarman cases demon-
strate that even a seemingly self-explanatory statutory term like "a
commercial activity carried on in the United States" has presented inter-
pretational problems.
2. Activity Within the United States "In Connection" with a
Commercial Activity Elsewhere
The second clause of the exception provides that immunity shall not
be granted if the claim is based upon a sovereign's act which was per-
formed in the United States "in connection" with its commercial activity
conducted elsewhere.94 This is the nexus approach to commercial activ-
ity. The interpretation of this clause has not been uniform. Some courts
follow a broad approach, while others follow a narrow one.
In Vencedora Oceanica Navigaclon v. Companie Nationale,95 the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit interpreted the second clause of
the commercial activity exception. Plaintiff, a vessel owner, brought suit
for the wrongful seizure and subsequent destruction of his vessel. The
vessel owner sued Algeria and its instrumentality in charge of Algeria's
harbor, alleging that they had tortiously deprived him of the vessel.9 6
The court ruled that in order to apply the FSIA clause there must be a
nexus between plaintiff's grievance and the foreign state's commercial
activity in the United States.9 7 Applying the rule to the facts, the court
found no nexus between the Algerian instrumentality's commercial activ-
ity in the United States and the vessel owner's claim that the instrumen-
tality tortiously deprived the owner of his vessel.9" Thus, it was held that
defendant was immune under the FSIA.9 9
Yessenin- Volpin v. Novosti Press Agency 1o presents a different inter-
pretation of the second provision of the exception. The plaintiff, as dis-
cussed above, was a Soviet dissident living in the United States. The
plaintiff sued two Soviet news agencies for publishing and distributing
defamatory news articles in the United States.10 1 The court held that the
defendants engaged in commercial activity by selling the articles to for-
93. Id. at 1061.
94. 28 U.S.C. at § 1605(a)(2).
95. 730 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1984).
96. Id.
97. Id. at 202.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. 443 F. Supp. 849 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
101. Id. at 851.
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eign media. °2 Despite the commercial nature of the acts, the court de-
cided that the alleged defamatory statements were not acts connected
with a commercial activity of the U.S.S.R.13 Instead, the court found
the acts to be a result of cooperation within the government to publish
articles. " 4 Yessenin-Volpin and Vencedora Oceanica demonstrate the
courts' struggles with application of the second clause of the commercial
activity exception, and the need for a clear standard or definition of the
clause.
3. An Act Outside the United States Which Causes a "Direct
Effect" in the United States
The third clause of the exception states that a claim can be based
upon an act that occurs outside the United States which is made in con-
nection with a sovereign's commercial activity elsewhere and which
causes a direct effect in the United States.01 This approach to commer-
cial activity establishes jurisdiction upon a connection or link between
the sovereign's commercial activity and the plaintiff's claim. A major
requirement of this clause is that the sovereign's act cause a direct effect
in the United States."0 6 Relying on the direct effect, the clause operates
as a type of jurisdictional long-arm statute to allow suits against foreign
states that do not actually carry on commercial activities in the United
States. 107 The following cases demonstrate how courts have struggled
with the interpretation of this clause.
In Berkovitz v. Islamic Republic of Iran,"°8 the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit found that the sovereign's activities did not cause a
direct effect in the United States. In Berkovitz, the spouse and children of
an American citizen murdered in Iran brought a wrongful death claim
against Iran and the Iranian revolutionary group as its agent.109 The
Ninth Circuit ruled that the commercial activity exception was inappli-
cable to an action against Iran for the wrongful death of an American
citizen working in Iran.110 The court reasoned that even though
102. Id. at 856.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 850. See also supra note 81 and accompanying text.
105. 8 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2).
106. House Report, supra note 2, at 19.
107. Note, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. Defining Commercial Activity and Di-
rect Effects Jurisdiction, 25 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 105 (1985). A long-arm statute extends
the reach of a state court's jurisdiction beyond the territorial limits of the state. Id. at 106.
108. 735 F.2d 329 (9th Cir. 1984).
109. Id. at 330.
110. Id. at 332.
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Berkovitz was in Iran as an employee pursuant to his company's contract
with Iran, Berkovitz's murder did not occur in connection with his job
and it did not cause a direct effect in the United States."' The court's
reasoning seemed to rest on the fact that murder was not a foreseeable
consequence of taking a job in Iran" 2 and, consequently, the effect was
not direct. Thus, Iran was held to be immune.
The district court in Carey v. National Oil Corp."3 also interpreted
the "direct effect" clause to find a foreign sovereign immune. In Carey, a
New York corporation and its assignee brought suit against the Libyan
Arab Republic and a corporation wholly owned by the Libyan govern-
ment seeking to recover damages for an alleged breach of contract to
supply petroleum products." 4 The contracts to supply the petroleum
were initially signed between the American corporation and Libya." 5
After the outbreak of the Yom Kippur War and the oil embargo imposed
by Libya, the plaintiff corporation agreed to a series of charter contracts
for delivery of petroleum to its two subsidiaries in the Bahamas and in
Libya." '6 The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants under the charter
contracts obtained excessive payments from the plaintiffs by duress.'
The district court found that Libya's alleged misconduct did not have a
direct effect in the United States because Libya did not consciously in-
volve the United States in any of its commercial undertakings.'s In-
stead, the court found that the activity involved was within the Bahamas
and, thus, had no direct effect in the United States." 9 Consequently, the
foreign defendants were granted immunity under the direct effect clause
of the FSIA.
In Upton v. Empire of Iran,"2 ° another district court ruled that it
lacked jurisdiction because plaintiff could not establish a direct effect. In
Upton the surviving relatives of two United States citizens, who were
killed when a roof collapsed at Tehran's international airport, brought
suit against Iran.'2 ' The court held that the connection between the
deaths sustained in Iran and its effects in the United States, the pain and
111. Id. at 330.
112. Id. at 332.
113. 453 F. Supp. 1097 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
114. Id. at 1099.
115. Id. at 1097.
116. Id. at 1099-1100.
117. Id. at 1098.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 1101.
120. 459 F. Supp. 264 (D.D.C. 1978), aff'd mem., 607 F.2d 494 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
121. Id. at 265.
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suffering of the survivors, was too attenuated. 122 The court reasoned that
the effects of the accident could only be felt in the United States if the
plaintiff returned alive to the United States. Thus, no effects would be
found by the fortuity that those killed were survived by United States
citizens.123 Because Iran's negligence, the personal injuries, and the
deaths all occured in Iran,124 there was no direct effect in the United
States and, consequently, the court dismissed the action for lack of
jurisdiction. 125
Some courts, however, have applied the direct effect test to find ju-
risdiction. For example, in National American Corp. v. Federal Republic
of Nigeria,126 plaintiff seller brought suit against the Republic of Nigeria
and the Central Bank of Nigeria as a result of a dispute arising out of
contracts for delivery of cement to Nicaragua. 127 The same court which
decided Carey held that "a breach of letter [of] credit having a New York
beneficiary, advised and payable through a New York bank met the di-
rect effect test.... ."2 8 Furthermore, the minimum contacts test of Shaf-
fer v. Heitner,129 was satisfied because the property that the plaintiff had
attached formed the basis of the litigation.130
As the above decisions indicate, the nexus and direct effect clauses
of the FSIA have been applied inconsistently. The courts, however, seem
to rely upon certain factors to make their decisions. One such factor is
whether the direct effect felt in the United States has an intervening ele-
ment or whether it flows in a straight line without deviation. For exam-
ple, in Upton, the court ruled that the direct effect must not have an
intervening element.' Another factor relied upon by the courts is
whether the effect is "substantial, direct and forseeable" as indicated in
Berkovitz. 3 2 Beyond these two factors, no consistent standard has been
revealed.
122. Id. at 266.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. 448 F. Supp. 622 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
127. Id. at 626.
128. Id. at 639.
129. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
130. NationalAm. Corp., 448 F. Supp. at 622.
131. Upton v. Empire of Iran, 459 F. Supp. at 264. A more recent case applied the same
analysis to an action of a commercial nature. In re Rio Grande Transport, 516 F. Supp. 1155
(S.D.N.Y. 1981). Texas Trading v. Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300 (2d Cir. 1981), applied a similar
analysis.
132. 735 F.2d 329 (9th Cir. 1984). See also notes 107-11 and accompanying text. Verlin-
den B.U. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 488 F. Supp. 1284 (S.D. N.Y. 1980), aff'd on other
grounds, 647 F.2d 320 (2d Cir. 1981), rev'd, 103 S. Ct. 1962 (1983).
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B. Noncommercial Tort Exception
The noncommercial tort exception authorizes jurisdiction over for-
eign sovereigns for tort actions in which the plaintiff seeks monetary re-
covery for personal injury, death, or property damage.' 3 3 The courts'
interpretations of the language and the provisions of this exception, as
with the commercial activity exception, have not been uniform.134 The
noncommercial tort exception has raised two difficult issues: (1) what
torts are covered by the exception, and (2) where the tort must occur in
order to fall within the exception.
1. Torts Covered by the Exception
The Act provides that the noncommerical tort exception will not
cover those torts covered by the commercial activity exception, nor will
it cover the torts of libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, abuse of pro-
cess, malicious prosecution, and interference with contractual rights.
1 35
Beyond that, the courts have discretion to decide which torts are covered
by the exception. The language of the statute, however, is so broad that
it really provides no guidance to the courts to determine what specific
torts are covered.
In Skeen v. Brazil,136 a district court held that assault and battery
did not fall within the noncommercial tort exception. 137 In that case, the
victim of an assault with a deadly weapon filed an action against a for-
eign ambassador, the grandson of the ambassador, and the country of
Brazil.' 38 Skeen sought damages for his injuries that occurred when the
grandson of a Brazilian ambassador assaulted and shot Skeen outside a
local nightclub. 139 The court held that assault with a deadly weapon was
not a tort covered under the noncommercial tort exception. '4 It rea-
soned that to fall within the exception, Skeen had to show that the de-
fendants' actions were "within the scope of his office of employment."'' 4'
The court further reasoned that the noncommercial tort exception is es-
sentially a respondeat superior statute, which holds an employer, the for-
133. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5).
134. Note, Foreign Sovereign Immunity--Whether United States Embassies are Jurisdic-
tional Territory Under the Noncommercial Tort Exception of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act, 14 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 413 (1984).
135. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5).
136. 66 F. Supp. 1414 (D.D.C. 1983).
137. Id. at 1417.
138. Id. at 1416.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 1415.
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eign state, liable for certain tortious acts of its employees. 42 When the
ambassador's grandson, who was employed by Brazil, assaulted Skeen,
the grandson was not acting within the scope of his employment.1
43
Therefore, Brazil could not be held liable for the plaintiff's injuries or for
the failure of its ambassador to prevent his grandson from committing
assault. 144
Yessenin-Volpin v. Novosti Press Agency,1 45 dicussed above,146 in-
volves libel, a tort that the noncommercial tort exception expressly does
not cover. The court in Yessenin-Volpin ruled that the Soviet govern-
ment was immune because libel was a tort that the exception does not
cover. 147
Finally, in De Sanchez v. Banco Central de Nicaragua,1 48 the Fifth
Circuit further clarified a tort which is not encompassed by the noncom-
mercial tort exception. In De Sanchez, the plaintiff asserted a claim for
conversion against a Nicaraguan state bank.1 49 The plaintiff asserted
that the Nicaraguan bank's failure to honor a check it had issued to her
constituted conversion. 150 The court ruled that "although nominally
within the ambit of the exception, [it] is not the type of tort claim that
the exception intended to cover."1 '' The court decided that plaintiff's
claim, although sounding in tort, was essentially a claim for unjust taking
of property and Congress had provided an exception in section
1605(a)(3) for property taken in violation of international law.1 52 In
light of the De Sanchez interpretation, not all types of conversion are
covered by the noncommercial tort exception.
The above cases illustrate that the types of torts covered under the
noncommercial activity exception of the FSIA remain unclear. Whether
a particular tort is covered is a question being answered on a case-by-case
basis. Case-by-case judicial interpretation leaves plaintiffs in an uncer-
tain position to determine whether they have a valid claim under the
FSIA. The plaintiffs' uncertain position is due to the broad and unclear
language of the noncommercial activity exception.
142. Id. at 1417.
143. Id. at 1418.
144. Id. at 1418-19.
145. 443 F. Supp. 849 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
146. For detailed facts of the case, see supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
147. 443 F. Supp. 849, 855 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
148. 770 F.2d 1385 (5th Cir. 1985). For additional facts and an in depth discussion of the
case, see infra notes 174-205 and accompanying text.
149. Id. at 1389.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 1398.
152. Id.
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2. Situs of the Tort
The required situs of the tort is another aspect of the exception that
the courts have found difficult to interpret. Some courts have suggested
that the non commercial tort exception applies only to tortious acts that
occur within the geographic territory of the United States.I 3 For exam-
ple, in Ianoch Tel Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, the district court held
the exception did not apply to a wrongful death and personal injury suit
that resulted from a Libyan attack on a bus transporting United States
citizens and visitors in Israel.' 54 The district court stated that "it is un-
doubted that sovereign immunity is still in effect for tort claims unless
the injury or death occurs within American borders."' 55 Thus, if the tort
does not occur in the territory of the United States, the victim cannot sue
the foreign entity in a United States court.
Other courts have interpreted the situs of the tort provision even
more narrowly. A district court In re Sedco, Inc. 156 held that the tort, in
whole, must occur in the United States. The Sedco case involved an oil
well drilling disaster off the coast of Mexico. 57 The district court found
the alleged acts or omissions to act "all took place in Mexico or in its
territorial waters in the Bay of Campeche, and the noncommercial excep-
tion [was], therefore, inapplicable."' 55 The Ninth Circuit also adopted a
narrow interpretation of the situs of the tort provision in McKeel v. Is-
lamic Republic of Iran.'59 The plaintiff, a former hostage at the United
States embassy in Iran, sued the Islamic Republic of Iran for personal
damages suffered as a result of his captivity.160 The court held that tor-
tious acts which occurred on an United States embassy did not fall
within the noncommercial tort exception requirement of a "tort occuring
in the United States."' 16 1 Thus, sovereign immunity barred plaintiff's suit
for damages. The Ninth Circuit reasoned in McKeel that although the
exception was cast in general terms, Congress did not intend to assert
jurisdiction over foreign states for events that occurred wholly within
their own territory. 62 The court determined that to hold otherwise
153. In re Sedco, Inc., 543 F. Supp. 561 (S.D. Tex. 1982); Hanoch Tel Oren v. Libyan Arab
Republic, 517 F. Supp. 542 (D.D.C. 1981).
154. 517 F. Supp. 542 (D.D.C. 1981).
155. Id. at 550.
156. 543 F. Supp. 561 (S.D. Tex. 1982).
157. Id. at 564.
158. Id. at 567.
159. 722 F.2d 582 (9th Cir. 1983).
160. Id.
161. Id. at 587.
162. Id. at 588.
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would be inconsistent with international law international law provides
that a state loses its sovereign immunity only for tortious acts that occur
in the territory of the forum state. 16
3
Upon facts similar to McKeel, the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit, in Persinger v. Islamic Republic ofIran, applied the
noncommercial tort exception to a tort that occurred in the United States
Embassy in Iran.164 The court reasoned that the legislature's failure to
define the scope of territory subject to the United States jurisdiction al-
lowed the court to interpret the FSIA to determine the meaning of the
phrase.1 65 According to the court, the FSIA's language did not specify
that "territory" meant only territory geographically in the United States.
Thus, the court reasoned that it could interpret the language to include
any territory abroad which was under United States jurisdiction.166 Fur-
ther, the court stated that although under international law United States
embassies are not regarded as United States territory, they are not neces-
sarily excluded from coverage under the FSIA.167 If plaintiff could show
that the United States exercises some form of jurisdiction over its embas-
sies, then embassies would fall within the territory contemplated by the
noncommercial tort exception. 168  The court also reasoned that the
United States' jurisdiction does not have to be exclusive, but can be con-
current with the jurisdiction of another country. 169 The court decided
that United States embassies fell under the broad regulatory authority of
Congress and that they are subject to State Department determinational
regulations governing consular affairs. 170 From this determination, the
court concluded that the United States exercises concurrent jurisdiction
over its embassies abroad. 71 Thus, the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals held that United States embassies abroad were territory subject
to the jurisdiction of the United States, and therefore, Iran's actions on
163. Id.
164. Persinger v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 729 F.2d 835 (D.D.C. 1984). In this case, a
former hostage and his parents brought an action against Iran for injuries inflicted by his
seizure and detention. Id. at 836.
165. Id. at 842.
166. Id. at 839. The Persinger court stated that "territory" could have two meanings. Id.
It could mean exclusive United States territory in a geographic sense or territory over which
the United States exercises some form of jurisdiction. Id. The court decided to adopt the
latter interpretation, but did not state its reasons.
167. Id.
168. Id. Because the court chose the jurisdictional interpretation of territory, a plaintiff
need only show that the sovereign's tortious act occured somewhere under the United States'
jurisidction to get jurisdiction under the noncommercial tort exception.
169. Id. at 840.
170. Id. at 839-41
171. Id. at 841.
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embassy grounds occurred "in the United States" within the meaning of
the noncommercial tort exception. 172 Consequently, Iran could not
claim immunity under the FSIA and the court had jurisdiction to hear
the case. 173
Under the Persinger court's broad interpretation of the situs of the
tort plaintiffs who suffer tort injuries on the premises of United States
embassy may recover for those injuries in a United States court. Thus,
the Persinger interpretation allows recovery for torts that occur on terri-
tory located outside the borders of the United States. The above cases
illustrate the broad range of interpretations that the courts have given the
situs of the tort provision.
C. De Sanchez v. Banco Central de Nicaragua
In De Sanchez v. Banco Central de Nicaragua,174 the Fifth Circuit
attempted to: (1) provide a clear standard for distinguishing commercial
and governmental activities for the purposes of the commercial activities
exception; (2) further define the torts included in the noncommercial tort
exception; and (3) clarify the extent of the relationship, if any, between
the commercial activity and noncommercial tort exceptions to the
FSIA. 175
1. Facts
In De Sanchez, plaintiff, a former citizen of Nicaragua and a resi-
dent of Florida, brought a claim against Nicaragua to collect on a
$150,000 certificate of deposit issued to her by Banco Nacional de Nica-
ragua.1 76 When De Sanchez went to the bank, she was told that Banco
Nacional did not have sufficient American currency on hand to honor
the certificate. 17 7 Banco Nacional requested currency from Banco Cen-
tral, with whom it held an account. 178 Banco Central complied with the
request and issued a check for $150,000 on its account with Citizens &
Southern International Bank ("C&S"), an American commercial bank
located in Louisiana. 17 When De Sanchez attempted to cash the check
at the C&S bank, officials of the bank refused to cash it because there
172. Id.
173. Id. at 835.
174. 770 F.2d 1385 (5th Cir. 1985).
175. Id.
176. De Sanchez v. Banco Central de Nicaragua, 515 F. Supp. 900 (E.D. La. 1981).
177. Id. at 901.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 902.
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were insufficient funds to cover it. 80 De Sanchez tried to cash the check
again a few days later, but it was returned. Banco Central continued to
refuse payment on the check.'
De Sanchez asserted four claims against defendant Banco Central:
breach of the duty to honor the check, breach of contract, misrepresenta-
tion, and conversion. 182 Banco Central successfully moved to dismiss,
contending that it was immune from suit on all claims because the FSIA
barred the court from assuming jurisdiction.'8 3
On De Sanchez's appeal from the dismissal, the Fifth Circuit held
that the FSIA's commercial activity exception did not apply.'8 4 It also
held that because appellant's claim sounded in property law rather than
tort law, the noncommercial tort exception to the FSIA did not apply.'
Since neither exception applied, Banco Central was immune from suit
under section 1604 of the FSIA and the court lacked jurisdiction over De
Sanchez's claim.' 86
2. Court's Reasoning
a. Commercial Activity Exception
The Fifth Circuit applied a three part test to determine whether the
FSIA's commercial activity exception was applicable.1 87 First, the Fifth
Circuit determined whether the relevant activity was defined with preci-
sion. This required an examination of the specific defendant's act.188
Second, the court determined whether the defendant's activity was sover-
eign or commercial by assessing the nature, rather than the purpose, of
the activity. 8 9 Third, the court determined that if the sovereign's activ-
180. Id. at 901.
181. Id. The check was marked "Refer to maker." C&S officials told De Sanchez that
because of the turmoil in Nicaragua, all payments from Banco Central's account had been
suspended. C&S had been instructed to stop payment by Dr. Arturo Cruz, the President of
Banco Central, who assumed office during the installation of the Nicaraguan revolutionary
junta. Id.
182. Id. De Sanchez named both Banco Central and C&S as defendants, but did not con-
test on appeal C&S's motion for summary judgment, which was granted by the district court.
De Sanchez, 770 F.2d at 1389.
183. De Sanchez, 770 F.2d at 1390.
184. Id. at 1385. See infra note 203 and accompanying text.
185. Id. at 1395. See infra notes 204-05 and accompanying text.
186. Id. at 1387. Section 1604 of the FSIA provides: "Subject to existing international
agreements to which the United States is a party at the time of enactment of this action a
foreign state shall be immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States and of the
States, except as provided in sections 1604 to 1607 of this chapter." 28 U.S.C. § 1604.
187. De Sanchez, 770 F.2d at 1391.
188. Id. at 1391 (citing Callejo v. Banicomer, S.A., 764 F.2d 1101, 1109 (5th Cir. 1985).
189. Id. at 1390 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d)).
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ity was indeed commercial, the activity had to have the requisite jurisdic-
tional nexus with the United States to fall within the commercial activity
exception to the FSIA.190
In defining the defendant's relevant activity with precision, the cir-
cuit court in De Sanchez focused on two primary facts: the actual issu-
ance of the check to the appellant, and the subsequent failure by the bank
to honor that check.191 After defining the relevant activity, the court
determined whether the activity was sovereign or commercial. The issu-
ance of the check was either a sale of foreign currency or regulation of
Nicaraguan foreign exchange reserves. 192 The Fifth Circuit ignored the
commercial aspects of the activity to hold that Banco Central's issuance
of the check and its subsequent failure to honor it were a means of regu-
lating Nicaragua's foreign exchange reserves.'93 The activity was, there-
fore, considered sovereign.194
The court analyzed the nature of Banco Central's activities.
Although the provisions of the FSIA explicitly state that courts must
look to the "nature of an activity rather than its purpose," the Fifth Cir-
cuit explained that absolute separation between nature and purpose was
not always possible. 195 The court reasoned that often the act's essence
was defined by its purpose, and that unless the court could inquire into
the purpose, it could not determine the act's nature. 196 The court be-
lieved this was especially true of commercial activites which were defined
by their profit-making nature. 197 The Fifth Circuit found that Banco
Central's purpose in selling currency defined the nature of the con-
duct.' 98 The bank was not engaging merely in the same activity as pri-
vate banks with a different purpose but was engaging in a different
activity. 199 The bank was "performing one of its intrinsically govern-
190. Id. at 1391. The court did not reach this stage of inquiry because it found the activity
to be governmental rather than commercial in nature. Id. at 1391 n.8.
191. Id. at 1390. The court did not focus on the connected activities of either the Nicara-
guan government or of Banco Central.
192. Id. at 1391.
193. Id. at 1393.
194. Id. at 1386. The Fifth Circuit distinguished sales of currency by Banco Central from
sales by private banks on the basis of the different purposes motivating the sales. Id.
195. Id. at 1393.
196. Id.
197. Id. See also House Report, supra note 2, at 16. The court seemed to interpret Con-
gressional intent to preclude foreign goverments from asserting sovereign immunity for all of
their activities because the majority of acts undertaken by a government could be interpreted
as undertaken for the public benefit.
198. Id. at 1393.
199. Id.
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mental functions as the Nicaraguan Central Bank."2" Thus, the bank
was "wearing its sovereign rather than its commercial hat."2 1 The court
determined that to hold the bank subject to suit for regulating Nicara-
gua's foreign exchange reserves would be contrary to the intent of the
FSIA, because such a holding would interfere with Nicaragua's funda-
mental governmental function and its right to make national policies.20 2
Thus, while the court acknowledged the commercial nature of bank-
ing and finance, it looked beyond the banking transaction to Banco Cen-
tral's function in issuing the plaintiff's particular type of check and its
later failure to honor that check. Finding that the bank functioned as a
state organ to regulate the country's foreign exchange rate, the court
held that the issuance of the check and failure to honor it were govern-
mental rather than commercial acts.20 3
b. Noncommercial Tort Exception
The Fifth Circuit also held that De Sanchez's claim against Banco
Central was not within the noncommercial tort exception.2° De
Sanchez alleged that Banco Central's failure to honor its check was con-
version of her property. The court decided that her claim, although
sounding in tort, was essentially a claim for unjust taking of property, a
tort which is covered by section 1605(a)(3) of the FSIA.20 5
c. Relationship Between the Noncommercial Tort and
Commercial Activity Exceptions
Whether a relationship exists between the noncommercial tort ex-
ception and the commercial tort activity exception is a question which
thus far has not been answered by any court. De Sanchez is one of the
few cases in which a plaintiff attempted to sue under both exceptions. De
Sanchez is also one of the few cases to discuss both exceptions in some
detail.20 6
De Sanchez indicates that if a plaintiff argues that a sovereign's ac-
tivity fits within the requirements of both the noncommercial tort and
commercial activity exceptions, the court is likely to find that the sover-
eign's activity fits neither exception. In De Sanchez, the plaintiff argued
200. Id.
201. Id. at 1394.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 1385.
204. Id. at 1396.
205. Id.
206. See supra notes 174-205 and accompanying text.
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that both the commercial activity and the noncommercial tort exceptions
applied to the Nicaraguan bank's activity-its refusal to honor its own
check.20 7 De Sanchez claimed that this activity was a commercial act
within the ambit of the commercial activity exception.20 8 She also al-
leged that the bank's refusal to honor the check was conversion and thus,
the bank's act was a tort, fitting within the noncommercial tort excep-
tion.2" 9 The Fifth Circuit, after extensive analysis, held that the bank's
refusal to honor the check was within the purview of neither exception
and denied jurisdiction.2 10
V. CRITICISMS AND IMPLICATIONS
A. Commercial Activity Exception
In De Sanchez, the Fifth Circuit determined that Banco Central's
conduct was governmental. The De Sanchez court's defined "govern-
mental activity" so broadly that virtually any activity could be classified
as governmental and accorded immunity. The court's broad definition
threatens the vitality of the FSIA, because the FSIA's main purpose was
to establish restrictive sovereign immunity in the United States. 11 The
court's all-encompassing definition of "governmental" is tantamount to
the doctrine of absolute sovereign immunity. The court seemed to reason
that a commercial entity engaging in commercial and govermental activi-
ties will be immune if the commercial activity indirectly affects the gov-
ernment.21 2 The purpose of the FSIA was to differentiate between
activities so that only governmental acts would be held immune.213 In
De Sanchez, the court found that the activity was commercial, yet pro-
ceeded to grant immunity to the commercial activity and its actor.
Moreover, the court's reasoning in De Sanchez did not tie the grant
of sovereign immunity to the particular function that Banco Central per-
formed. Regulation of the foreign exchange rate is hardly synonymous
with the activity in question-nonpayment of a debt the bank owed to
one of its customers. The bank's refusal to honor the check is a breach of
contract between the bank and its client; as such, a foreign sovereign
should be just as liable as any other citizen. This is especially significant
because the FSIA was intended to make a foreign sovereign accountable,
207. De Sanchez, 770 F.2d at 1389.
208. Id. at 1390.
209. Id. at 1398-99.
210. Id. at 1399.
211. House Report, supra note 2, at 6-7.
212. De Sanchez, 770 F.2d at 1392-93.
213. House Report, supra note 2, at 7.
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when acting as a commercial entity, for any deviations from the provi-
sions of a commercial agreement.214 By refusing to honor its check, the
bank was acting as a commercial entity and, therefore, should have been
liable for its debt as would any other commercial bank. The district
court's determination that Banco Central's activities were predominantly
commercial215 seems correct. The fact that the bank's activities had a
governmental aspect to them is irrelevant. If one engages in commercial
conduct one should be treated as a commercial party according to com-
mercial principles. If a commercial activity, such as nonpayment of a
check, is classified as a governmental act then the definition of govern-
mental activities may be extended to include any activity of a company
or a government which influences a governmental function.
The De Sanchez standard of distinguishing governmental acts from
commercial is different from past decisions which have applied the com-
mercial activity exception, in that De Sanchez stretches the language of
the exception further than others courts. The broad statutory language
of the exception and the commercial activity definition provide essen-
tially all courts with the authority to constantly reinterpret the statute.
Some courts construe the language of the exception more broadly than
others.216 In Harris v. VAO Intourist Moscow, the court construed the
language of the commercial activity exception narrowly. 21 7 Because the
commercial activity in that case did not occur in the United States and
had no direct effect in the United States as required by the exception, the
court correctly decided that it had no jurisdiction over the defendant.218
Conversely, in Sugarman v. AeroMexico, Inc.,219 the court chose to
stretch the language of the exception. The exception provides that the
commercial activity giving rise to the plaintiff's claim must occur in the
214. Legislative history as ennunciated in the Congressional House Report suggests that
the FSIA was intended to allow American citizens to force foreign entities to be more responsi-
ble for their actions. See House Report, supra note 2, at 9. The FSIA was enacted to codify
restrictive sovereign immunity. See House Report, supra note 2, at 9. Under restrictive sover-
eign immunity, foreign entities are held accountable for their commercial acts and, thus, are
treated as any private party engaging in commercial conduct. House Report, supra note 2;
Tate Letter, supra note 3.
215. De Sanchez v. Banco Central de Nicaragua, 515 F. Supp. 900 (E.D. La. 1981). The
district court stated that Banco Central's activities generally are of a private, commercial na-
ture. The only function of this bank that could be classified as governmental is their regulation
of the foreign exchange, which began when Nicaragua's government was overthrown by the
revolutionary junta.
216. See supra notes 84-122 and accompanying text for examples of courts interpreting the
statutory language of the commercial activity exception.
217. 481 F. Supp. 1056 (E.D.N.Y. 1979). See supra notes 90-93 and accompanying text.
218. Id.
219. 626 F.2d 270 (3d Cir. 1980). See supra notes 84-89 and accompanying text.
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United States.22 ° In Sugarman, the plaintiff sued for injuries that he re-
ceived while at an airport in Mexico, not in the United States.22 1 The
injuries were the basis of the claim. But, the court managed to tie the
injuries to the defendant's commercial conduct in the United States and
construe the commercial conduct as the basis of the claim.22 2
Courts like De Sanchez are able to stretch the language of the excep-
tion because the difference between commercial and governmental activi-
ties is not clear. Between activities which are clearly governmental, such
as making national policy, and those which are clearly commercial, such
as a profit-making contract for the sale of goods between a manufacturer
and a retailer, there is a "grey area." In this grey area, those activities
which are labeled commercial or governmental are purely a matter of
interpretation. In this area, courts like De Sanchez are able to broadly
interpret the definition of governmental activity under the exception.
The problems which exist with the interpretation and application of
the commercial activity exception's three clauses also seem to relate to
the lack of a clear definition of commericial activity. If the legislature or
the courts clearly defined "commercial activity," courts would have less
difficulty determining whether a sovereign had conducted activity in the
United States, whether a connection existed between the commercial ac-
tivity conducted elsewhere and acts performed in the United States, or
whether the commercial act had caused a direct effect in the United
States.
Courts which have interpreted and applied the second clause of the
commercial activity exception have required a strong connection between
the defendant's commercial activities abroad and the defendant's activi-
ties in the United States.
In Yessenin- Volpin v. Novosti Press Agency, a district court decided
that despite the commercial nature of defendant's activites, the alleged
libelous acts were not connected with a commercial activity of the USSR
and were thus immune.223 In Vencedora Oceanica Navigation v. Compa-
gnie Nationale,22 4 the Fifth Circuit found no nexus between an Algerian
instrumentality's commercial activity in the United States and plaintiff's
claim that he was tortiously deprived of his vessel by Algeria. Algeria
220. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5).
221. 626 F.2d at 270.
222. The commercial conduct upon which the court based its decision was that the defend-
ant conducted its operation as a common carrier in the United States and plaintiff bought his
plane ticket in New Jersey. Id. at 270.
223. 443 F. Supp. 849, (S.D.N.Y. 1978). See supra notes 99-102 and accompanying text.
224. 730 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1984).
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was, therefore, found to be immune. 225
Both courts determined there was insufficient nexus between the de-
fendant's commercial acts in the United States and its acts elsewhere to
establish jurisdiction. Neither court, however, precisely defined the de-
gree of connection necessary to meet the nexus requirement. Thus, liti-
gants have no clear standard to determine whether a defendant's contacts
are sufficient to comply with the nexus requirement. While some magic
nexus or connection between the foreign sovereign's act in the United
States and its commercial activity conducted elsewhere must exist, the
extent of the connection required is left to the interpretation of each
court.
Inconsistent interpretation of the third clause of the commercial ac-
tivity exception 226 also makes it difficult for litigants to determine
whether their cause of action constitutes one which results in a "direct
effect" in the United States. The death of a United States citizen while
working in Iran was determined not to create a direct effect in the United
States.227 No direct effect was found in a breach of contract action when
the contracts were with the plaintiff corporation's United States subsidi-
22aries. 28 Conversely, a direct effect was found when a disputed letter of
credit was payable through a New York bank and the beneficiary resided
in New York.22 9 While failure to pay on a letter of credit and failure to
pay for delivery of goods do not seem to be all that different, especially
since the entities ultimately affected by the failure to pay are United
States corporations, the broad language of the commercial activity excep-
tion allows courts to interpret its clauses as including or excluding facts
which are not necessarily different. Thus, what constitutes a direct effect
in the United States remains for the courts to decide on a case by case
basis. The lack of one consistent standard makes it difficult for litigants
to figure out whether they have a valid cause of action and whether they
should even pursue litigation under the FSIA. Application of inconsis-
tent standards may also encourage litigants to engage in forum shopping.
Broad judicial interpretations of the commercial activity exception
225. Id.
226. National Am. Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 448 F. Supp. 622 (S.D.N.Y.
1978); Carey v. National Oil Corp., 453 F. Supp. 1097 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Upton v. Empire of
Iran. 459 F. Supp. 264 (D.D.C. 1978).
227. Berkovitz v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 735 F.2d 329 (9th Cir. 1984). See supra notes
108-11 and accompanying text.
228. Carey v. National Oil Corp., 453 F. Supp. 1097 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). See supra notes 109-
11 and accompanying text.
229. National Am. Corp., 448 F. Supp. 622. See supra notes 117-20 and accompanying
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could also have international implications. The De Sanchez case could be
used as precedent by banks in other foreign nations to justify nonpay-
ment to their American customers. Banks could claim that they were
performing a regulatory function of some kind for the government and
under the De Sanchez standard the banks would be immune. After De
Sanchez, an American with funds in a foreign bank may never be able to
enforce the payment of a check issued by that bank.
The De Sanchez analysis could logically be extended to any com-
pany supplying its government with goods or services that indirectly af-
fect its governmental functions. For example, a Nicaraguan
manufacturer that makes men's dress shoes as well as shoes for the Nica-
raguan army, might come to the United States to purchase leather. The
manufacturer, to avoid paying for the leather, could claim that because it
manufactures shoes for the Nicaraguan army the shoe company is gover-
mental in nature and therefore is immune from suit. The company could
argue that if it had to pay its debt it would not have enough money to
manufacture shoes for the army, and the army would be rendered unable
to march, thus jeopardizing national security. This indirect effect on the
government is similar to the indirect effect argument presented by Banco
Central in De Sanchez. Although the lawsuit in De Sanchez involved a
debt the bank owed De Sanchez, it was not clear how the debt was re-
lated to regulating the currency rate. The bank's claim was that payment
of De Sanchez's check would reduce the available foreign currency funds
in Nicaragua.2 30 Under this analysis, however, all banks and partial gov-
ernmental agencies could claim that payment of their bills would shrink
the foreign currency treasury.
If courts accept defense claims of an indirect effect on the govern-
ment, unpredictability in the international business arena could result.
Future courts, however, may limit this argument to when the foreign
company's nation is experiencing political or economic turmoil.
Additionally, leaving the exception's interpretation to a case by case
analysis, courts may become influenced by the political aspects of each
case. The political power of the defendant nation and the possible for-
eign relations ramifications may become factors that a court considers in
reaching its decision regarding whether the activity in question is within
the commercial activity exception. In both De Sanchez and Yessenin-
Volpin, it appeared the decisions were influenced by political factors not
unlike a decision the State Department would have made under similar
230. De Sanchez, 770 F.2d at 1393.
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circumstances.231 In Yessenin-Volpin, the court appeared to be influ-
enced by the political clout of the Soviet Union and the possible implica-
tions for American-Soviet relations when it classified as sovereign the
Soviet news agencies' commercial activities of publishing and distributing
libelous articles.232 Similarly, the court in De Sanchez seemed to rely on
factors other than the "nature of the activity" to classify as governmental
an activity which traditionally was viewed as commercial. The court
likely was influenced by the potential effect of the decision upon Ameri-
can-Nicaraguan relations as well as the political turmoil existing in Nica-
ragua at the time of the decision.233 When a court is influenced by
political aspects of a case, a decision is not in keeping with the legislative
policy of "depoliticizing" sovereign immunity determinations.234 Yet de-
spite the drafters' intent, it appears courts still consider foreign policy in
determining whether to grant sovereign immunity. De Sanchez and Yes-
senin-Volpin seem to indicate that even if an activity is commercial on its
face, the court can and will recharacterize it as governmental if the court
believes there will be significant political ramifications should it deter-
mine that jurisdiction exists.
B. Noncommercial Tort Exception
The inconsistent application of the noncommercial tort exception
and its territorial limitations results in an ambiguous standard. The lack
of a consistent standard renders case outcomes unpredictable and may
create forum shopping by plaintiffs seeking a court favorable to their po-
sition. De Sanchez did little to clarify the requirements for proper appli-
cation of the noncommercial tort exception. Because the language of the
noncommercial tort exception is broad, it lends itself to case-by-case in-
terpretation. For example, Skeen v. Brazil held that the tort of an assault
231. The State Department, prior to the enactment of the FSIA, essentially decided the
sovereign immunity cases. Its decisions were based largely on the political factors in the cases.
See supra notes 41-51 and accompanying text.
232. Vessenin-Volpin v. Novosti Press Agency, 443 F. Supp. 849 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). See
supra notes 99-102 and accompanying text.
233. De Sanchez, 515 F. Supp. 900 (E.D. La. 1981). At the time of the decision, Nicaragua
had just undergone a revolution. De Sanchez, 770 F.2d at 1386. Shortly after the revolution-
ary junta began to govern, exchange control regulations were adopted limiting foreign ex-
change to ten specific purposes. Id. at 1387. Nicaragua was also experiencing a deficit of over
$200 million in foreign exchange and its total liquidity was purported to be more than three
and one half million dollars, barely enough to meet an average day's import requirements. De
Sanchez, 515 F. Supp. at 902. Because of all the monetary problems Nicaragua was experienc-
ing, even if the Fifth Circuit ruled in De Sanchez's favor, the revolutionary government would
have been unlikely to comply with a ruling that her check must be honored.
234. House Report, supra note 2, at 7. See also supra note 51 and accompanying text.
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did not fall within the exception.235 In that case, the sovereign was held
immune from liability for the tortious act of the grandson of its agent, the
ambassador. 236 The court reasoned that the grandson was not acting
within the scope of his employment when he assaulted the victim, and
therefore, his actions could not be attributed to the sovereign.237 What
constituted actions within the scope of employment for a representative
of a foreign government was not enunciated. Therefore, the court left
unclear exactly when an assault by a foreign sovereign will be actionable
and when it will not. In fact, the court's reasoning regarding the nonap-
plicability of the noncommercial tort exception is subject to criticism.
In De Sanchez, Banco Central refused to honor the check it had
previously issued to De Sanchez and it kept her money.238 It is difficult
to conceive of a clearer example of conversion. Still, the Fifth Circuit
decided that the bank's actions did not constitute conversion but instead
was an unjust taking of property.239 The court, however, never really
explained the difference between the two torts nor did it state whether
conversion was a tort covered by the noncommercial tort exception.
Thus, which torts are included and excluded by the exception is still open
to question.
The main problem in interpreting this exception, however, is deter-
mining whether a tort has occurred in the United States. Some courts
strictly interpret the language of the exception and require that the tort
occur in the continental United States, while others interpret the langu-
gage more broadly. Generally, a narrow interpretation is rendered when
injuries occur in an area within the exclusive jurisdiction of another
country and do not involve any question of concurrent United States
jurisdiction.2 4'
For example, in Hanoch Tel Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, the
court held that the exception did not apply to a wrongful death and per-
sonal injury suit arising out of an attack in Israel on a bus containing
United States citizens.241 The court stated that the tort must occur in the
continental United States, otherwise the American citizen has no valid
cause of action in an American court.242 In In re Sedco, Inc. 243 the court
235. 66 F. Supp. 1414 (D.D.C. 1983).
236. Id. at 1418.
237. Id.
238. De Sanchez, 707 F.2d at 1387.
239. Id. at 1339.
240. See infra text accompanying notes 241-46.
241. Hanoch Tel Oren, 517 F. Supp. at 544.
242. Id. at 548-50.
243. 543 F. Supp. 561 (S.D. Tex. 1982).
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held that the whole tort must occur in the United States. Thus, the tor-
tious acts or omissions which occurred in Mexico precluded application
of the noncommercial tort exception. These interpretations of the excep-
tion limit the ability of American citizens to recover when injured by a
foreign sovereign. The effect of the court's decisions is that American
citizens must seek recovery from the courts in whichever country their
injury occurs. If a foreign country chooses not to acknowledge the claim
of an American citizen, the American is left with no remedy.
When a tort involving a foreign sovereign occurs in a place subject
to concurrent jurisdiction, United States courts have more readily ap-
plied the exception. In Persinger v. Islamic Republic of Iran, the District
of Columbia Court of Appeals allowed a plaintiff to recover for a tort
that occurred at a United States embassy. The court ruled that the situs
of a tort for recovery purposes under the noncommercial tort exception
can be a United States embassy located in a foreign territory or in inter-
national waters. 2" Thus, the court effectively extended the ambit of the
exception to situations in which the United States and another country
have concurrent jurisdiction.245 Because Persinger demonstrated that
the United States exercised some form of jurisdiction over its embassies,
his claim was found to fall within the boundaries of the noncommercial
tort exception.246
The Persinger interpretation of the exception's language was unprec-
edented. If other courts follow the Persinger court's analysis, jurisdiction
of United States courts could be extended beyond the legislature's intent.
In enacting the FSIA, Congress stated that the noncommercial tort ex-
ception was intended mainly to facilitate recovery by United States traffic
accident victims for accidents caused by foreign diplomatic personnel
driving in the United States.247 Congress never stated nor implied that
United States courts should have jurisdiction over claims arising in terri-
tories over which the United States only has concurrent jurisdiction. To
allow recovery in concurrent jurisdiction cases could lead to a great in-
crease in litigation and to a need to enforce judgments in foreign territo-
ries never contemplated by Congress when it enacted the FSIA.
One year earlier, the Ninth Circuit ruled, upon identical facts as
Persinger, that United States courts have no jurisdiction over United
244. Persinger, 729 F.2d at 839.
245. Id. at 840.
246. Id.
247. House Report, supra note 2, at 21.
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States embassies abroad.248 The court determined that to rule otherwise
would be contrary to the prevailing international law which provides that
a foreign sovereign may be held liable only for torts that occur within the
territory of the forum state. 249 This interpretation comports with the
legislative intent behind the FSIA. To allow United States courts to ex-
ercise jurisdiction over foreign states for acts committed by foreign
agents on United States embassy grounds is contrary to most foreign sov-
ereigns' conceptions of sovereignty. Most foreign states consider them-
selves sovereign over territory within their borders.250 The Persinger
interpretation effectively makes United States embassies part of the
United States territory for jurisdicitonal purposes. Thus, the Persinger
interpretation could create hostility and strain diplomatic relations be-
tween the United States and other countries.
C. Relationship Between the Noncommercial Tort and the
Commercial Activity Exceptions
Thus far, most courts have failed to specify the relationship between
the commercial activity exception and the noncommercial tort exception.
A few courts have discussed the relationship between the two exceptions,
but have not done so in a thorough manner.251 De Sanchez v. Banco
Central de Nicaragua,252 is a recent decision that discusses the relation-
ship between the exceptions in some detail.
De Sanchez illustrates the phenomenon that once the court deter-
mines that one FSIA exception is inapplicable, the other exception is also
likely to be found inapplicable. This phenomenon is also evident in other
cases. For example, in In re Sedco, Inc.,253 the plaintiffs sued a Mexican
company for tortious injuries to the southern coast of Texas, caused by
an oil spill that occurred while an oil well was being drilled in the Gulf of
Mexico.2" 4 The plaintiffs argued that both the commercial activity and
the noncommercial tort exceptions applied, giving the United States
248. McKeel v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 722 F.2d 582 (9th Cir. 1983). See supra notes
159-63 and accompanying text.
249. Id. at 588.
250. Tiets v. People's Republic of Bulgaria, 28 I.L.R. 369 (1963).
251. De Sanchez v. Banco Central de Nicaragua, 770 F.2d 1385, 1398 (5th Cir. 1985);
Persinger v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 729 F.2d 835 (D.C. Cir. 1984); In re Sedco, Inc., 543 F.
Supp. 561 (S.D. Tex. 1982); United Euram Corp. v. U.S.S.R., 461 F. Supp. 609 (S.D.N.Y.
1978); Carey v. National Oil Corp., 453 F. Supp. 1097 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd on other
grounds, 592 F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1979); Yessenin-Volpin v. Novosti Press Agency, 443 F. Supp
849 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
252. 770 F.2d 1385 (5th Cir. 1985).
253. 543 F. Supp. 561 (S.D. Tex. 1982).
254. Id. at 564-65.
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courts jurisdiction over the Mexican company. The court held that
neither exception applied. 5 The commercial activity exception did not
apply because the Mexican company sued was characterized as an arm of
the Mexican government and also because the court found the company's
acts to be sovereign in that the Mexican government charged the com-
pany with exploring and planning Mexico's state-owned natural re-
sources.256 The specific acts the court focused on and found to be
sovereign rather than governmental were state efforts to determine the
extent of Mexico's natural resources. 5 7 The noncommerical tort excep-
tion did not apply because the court found that efforts to determine a
nation's natural resources were discretionary acts done in furtherance of
the company's legal mandate to explore for Mexico's hydrocarbon depos-
its. 58 Discretionary acts are explicitly exempted from the ambit of the
exception in section 1605(a)(5)(A).2 9 Thus, the Sedco court, like the De
Sanchez court, interpreted the acts which were the basis of the lawsuit to
be applicable under neither exception and denied jurisdiction. 6 °
Carey v. National Oil Corp.2 61 provides another illustration. In Ca-
rey, an American corporation brought suit against Libya and a corpora-
tion wholly owned by the Libyan government, seeking to recover
damages for an alleged breach of contract to supply petroleum prod-
ucts. 262 Specifically, plaintiffs claimed that defendants obtained excessive
payments from plaintiffs by duress.263 The court found neither exception
applicable to the case.264 The noncommercial tort exception was inappli-
cable because the duress exerted by the corporation was interpreted to be
an act of nationalization by Libya, which is a quintessentially sovereign
act or at most an interference with contract rights.2 65 The commercial
activity exception did not apply because the alleged misconduct did not
have a direct effect on the United States. 66 Thus, as in De Sanchez, once
255. Id. at 566-67.
256. Id. at 564-66.
257. Id. at 565.
258. Id. at 567.
259. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5)(A).
260. Other cases serve to illustrate the phenomenon that once a court finds one exception
inapplicable, the other exception is also likely to be found inapplicable. See Berkovitz v. Is-
lamic Republic of Iran, 735 F.2d 329 (9th Cir. 1984); Yessenin-Volpin v. Novosti Press
Agency, 443 F. Supp. 849 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
261. 453 F. Supp. 1097 (1978).
262. Id. at 1099-1100.
263. Id. at 1100.
264. Id.at 1100-02.
265. Id. at 1102.
266. Id. at 1101. See infra note 235 and accompanying text.
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the Carey court found the alleged misconduct was not within the ambit
of one exception, it proceeded to find the other exception similarly
inapplicable.
Cases which interpret the two exceptions raise questions regarding
the interrelationship between the exceptions. The De Sanchez court did
not address whether recovery under one exception to the FSIA precludes
recovery under the other exception. While no court has ruled explicitly
that recovery under one exception precludes recovery under the other,
the court in Persinger v. Islamic Republic of Iran267 has stated that a
comparison of the noncommercial tort and the commercial activity ex-
ception demonstrated that Congress intended the former to be narrower
than the latter.268 The commercial activity exception, on the one hand,
explicitly provides that a foreign sovereign's commercial activities
"outside the territory of the United States" having a "direct effect" in the
United States may allow a United States court to deny sovereign immu-
nity.269 The noncommercial tort exception, on the other hand, does not
provide for a "direct effect" exception. When Congress uses express lan-
guage in one part of a statute to cover a specific situation and then uses
different language in another part of the same statute, a strong inference
arises that the two provisions do not mean the same thing.2 70 Yet, the
fact that some plaintiffs have successfully fit one cause of action under
both exceptions without much difficulty demonstrates just how broadly
the provisions of the statute are worded. It also demonstrates that plain-
tiffs are at the mercy of the courts, who may or may not decide that the
exceptions apply to the facts of a case. This problem is aggravated by the
fact that there is little consistent precedent for the courts to follow.
Because the noncommercial tort exception has been interpreted to
require that the injury occur in the territorial United States, 271 the "di-
rect effect" provision of the commercial activities exception is important.
Theoretically, the direct effect provision allows plaintiffs to recover for
harm caused by a sovereign, especially those plaintiffs who would be pre-
cluded from recovery under the noncommercial tort exception. Conse-
267. 729 F.2d 835 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
268. Id. at 843.
269. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2).
270. Persinger, 729 F.2d at 843. See also Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983);
United States v. Martino, 681 F.2d 952, 954 (5th Cir. 1982) (quoting United States v. Wong
Kim Bo, 472 F.2d 720, 722 (5th Cir. 1972)).
271. For a general discussion of this interpretation, see supra notes 153-63 and accompany-
ing text. Two cases have held to the contrary: Persinger v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 729 F.2d
835, (D.C. Cir. 1984) and Olsenby Sheldon v. Government of Mexico, 729 F.2d 641 (9th Cir.
1984). See also supra notes 164-73 and accompanying text.
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quently, plaintiffs seeking to recover for harm which occurred outside the
territorial United States should always include a cause of action under
the commercial activity exception clause. However, plaintiffs have been
unsuccessful in arguing: (1) that although the alleged tort occurred
outside the United States, it had a direct effect in the United States272; or
(2) that the definition of United States should include embassies2 73 and
bodies of water.274
The interrelationship between the two exceptions raises another is-
sue: whether an action based on one of the torts excluded by the non-
commercial tort exception275 could be brought under the commercial
activity exception, provided the requirements of the latter exception were
met. Two courts have answered that a plaintiff could do so2 76 while one
has disagreed.277 In Yessenin-Volpin, the plaintiff brought an action in
libel. Libel is explicitly excluded as a cause of action under the noncom-
mercial tort exception.278 The court, however, took jurisdiction under
the commercial activity exception.279 Similarly in United Euram Corp.,
the court took jurisdiction under the commercial activity exception on a
cause of action for interference with contractual relations, 280 which is
expressly excluded by the noncommercial tort exception.28 l The con-
tracts required the plaintiff impressario to pay cash fees to the Soviet
State Concert Society, as well as paying artists' salaries and tour ex-
penses.282 The Society was to send artists to the United States and Great
Britain to give performances organized by the plaintiff.283 These con-
tracts were pursuant to a cultural exchange agreement between the
United States and the Soviet Union.284 The court held that the cause of
action was within the commercial activity exception, and proceeded to
272. Hanoch Tel Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 517 F. Supp. 542 (D.D.C. 1981). See also
supra notes 154-55 and accompanying text.
273. McKeel v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 722 F.2d 582 (9th Cir. 1984). See supra notes
158-63 and accompanying text.
274. In re Sedco, Inc., 543 F. Supp. 561 (S.D. Tex. 1982). See supra notes 156-62 and
accompanying text.
275. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5)(B). See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
276. Yessenin-Volpin v. Novosti Press Agency, 443 F. Supp. 849, 855-56 (S.D.N.Y. 1978);
United Euram Corp. v. U.S.S.R., 461 F. Supp. 609, 612 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
277. Carey v. National Oil Corp., 453 F. Supp. 1097, 1102 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), afff'd on other
grounds, 592 F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1979).
278. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5)(B). See supra note 68.
279. 443 F. Supp. 849, 855.
280. United Euram Corp., 461 F. Supp. at 611.
281. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5)(B).
282. United Euram Corp. v. U.S.S.R., 461 F. Supp. 609 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
283. Id. at 610.
284. Id.
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add that even though the noncommercial tort exception was intended to
cover noncommercial torts, the restrictions embodied in subsection
1605(a)(5)(B) were not intended to restrict the scope of the commercial
activity exception.285
Conversely, in Carey v. National Oil Corp., the court stated that a
claim under the commercial activity exception could not be based upon
one of the torts expressly excluded by the noncommercial tort excep-
tion.286 In that case, the causes of action were also interference with
contractual relations and breach of contract, both of which are excluded
by the noncommercial tort exception from the scope of the FSIA.28 7 The
court decided that the alleged misconduct was not within the ambit of
the commercial activity exception and granted sovereign immunity to
Libya.288 Thus, the success of a suit under the commercial activity ex-
ception based on one of the torts listed in the noncommercial tort excep-
tion 289 depends on the court whicb hears the case. Some courts believe
there is a relationship between the exceptions,290 while others do not.29'
Therefore, it becomes a case-by-case determination whether a relation-
ship exists between the exceptions.
Finally, the issue of the interrelationship between the commercial
activity and noncommercial tort exceptions can be seen to relate to at-
tachment under section 1610 of the FSIA.292 The commercial activity
exception has an attachment or a judgment enforcement provision in sec-
tion 1610 of the FSIA,29 3 while the noncommerical tort exception does
not. Thus, a plaintiff who successfully obtains jurisdicition under the
noncommercial tort exception, and prevails on the merits, still will not be
able to attach the defendant's property. Conversely, a plaintiff who ob-
tains a judgment against a sovereign's instrumentality, or against the
soverign itself under the commerical activity exception, may enforce the
judgment under section 1610 of the FSIA. As a result, plaintiffs stand a
better chance of recovering on their judgments if they sue under the com-
mercial activity exception.
285. Id. at 612.
286. 453 F. Supp. 1097, 1102 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). See supra notes 113-19 and accompanying
text.
287. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5)(B).
288. 453 F. Supp. 1097.
289. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5)(B). See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
290. Yessenin-Volpin v. Novosti Press Agency, 443 F. Supp. 849, 855-56 (S.D.N.Y. 1978);
United Euram Corp. v. U.S.S.R., 461 F. Supp. 609, 612 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
291. Carey v. National Oil Corp., 453 F. Supp. 1097, 1102 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd on other
grounds, 592 F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1979).
292. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5)(B).
293. Id.
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The foregoing discussion indicates that the relationship between the
commercial activity and the noncommercial tort exceptions remains un-
clear. Courts have not explicitly ruled that suing under one exception
precludes the plaintiff from suing under the other; that is, they have not
specified that the exceptions are mutually exclusive. Since courts have
not clarified the nature of the relationship between the exceptions, liti-
gants do not know whether they should pursue litigation under both ex-
ceptions, especially if by doing so they could jeopardize their chances of
winning under either one of the exceptions.
VI. SUGGESTIONS AND PROPOSALS
As has been discussed and illustrated throughout this Note, the in-
terpretations of the noncommercial tort and the commercial activity ex-
ceptions are imbued with confusion and inconsistency. The problems
seem to emanate largely from the broad phrasing of the exceptions. The
wording of the FSIA is so broad that the decision whether or not to grant
immunity comes down to a case-by-case interpretation of the cause of
action and its facts, and courts such as De Sanchez have leeway to
broaden the boundaries of the FSIA to unprecedented extents. Because
each exception is plagued with its own unique problems, the remedies for
each exception will be discussed separately.
A. Commercial Activity Exception
The provisions of the FSIA's commercial activity exception are
phrased very broadly. Such broad phrasing has forced the courts to in-
terpret the FSIA and thereby to determine sovereign immunity on a case-
by-case basis. These piecemeal determinations have resulted in confusing
and inconsistent standards. Amendment of the commercial activity ex-
ception provisions may remedy this problem. The amendment should
explicitly specify what activities qualify as "commercial," and what ac-
tivities qualify as "governmental." Specifying activities as either govern-
mental or commercial would simplify the courts' application of the
exception. Despite the potential benefits, however, such amendment may
be impracticable. Further, Congress may be reluctant to enumerate acts
that qualify as commercial because in so doing it may preclude the appli-
cation of the exception to activities which have not yet been identified.
If amending the commercial activity exception in this manner is not
feasible, then a different standard of what qualifies as commercial activity
should be adopted. The standard should be narrower than the one ad-
1987]
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vanced by the De Sanchez294 court, because the De Sanchez standard of
commerical activity could present unpredictability in international busi-
ness transactions. To avoid unpredictability, courts should reject the
claims of sovereign immunity as to activities which affect the government
indirectly. More specifically, such claims should be rejected if they are
made by a governmental agency which is a "commercial governmental
hybrid" like the bank in the De Sanchez case.295 The granting of sover-
eign immunity should be restricted to traditional governmental func-
tions. De Sanchez would have been resolved differently applying this
narrower standard because the bank would have been granted immunity
only if regulation of foreign currency was the issue in the lawsuit. If in
De Sanchez the bank devalued the Nicaraguan currency from ten Cordo-
bas per American dollar to fifty Cordobas per dollar, De Sanchez's check
would have fallen drastically in value. In this situation, De Sanchez
would have no claim against the bank for her loss because the bank's act
would be within the scope of its function of regulating the foreign ex-
change rate.
Other solutions to the problem of inconsistent implementation of
the commercial activity exception might be appropriate. First, Congress
could enact a statute requiring a foreign company to file with the Secre-
tary of State or a similar United States governmental entity a list of activ-
ities that are recognized as governmental by the nation where the foreign
company is incorporated or where it conducts the majority of its busi-
ness. The companies would not be able to default on commercial obliga-
tions by claiming immunity unless they had filed information previously
with the United States government indicating that the transaction in
question was considered a governmental act. This information would be
publicly available and thus, would serve as notice to private citizens en-
tering contracts with the foreign company. Such information would be
especially important when dealing with companies from Socialist nations
where the government is ubiquitous. For example, as Yessenin-Volpin
illustrated, the publishing of propaganda by a commercial entity such as
a newspaper was seen as a Soviet governmental function. 96 In the
United States, a similar newspaper publication could not claim sovereign
immunity for any of its acts.
Statutory filing may not be considered a feasible solution because
Congress may be willing to incur the expense necessary to register the
filings. Congress would not have to enforce filings, however, because
294. See supra notes 183-202 and accompanying text.
295. See supra notes 187-202 and accompanying text.
296. Yessenin-Volpin v. Novosti Press Agency, 443 F. Supp. 849, 856 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
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they would be enforced by the courts with the finding of no sovereign
immunity. Another objection to such a filing requirement may come
from foreign countries that consistently conduct business with the United
States. These countries may not want to trouble themselves with filing
and may not want to fie because it could restrict their future behavior.
If, however, these countries want to conduct business with United States
companies they would have to comply with such a statutory filing.
Second, the commerical activity exception could be made more con-
sistent by having United States companies require express contractual
waivers of sovereign immunity from foreign entities with which they con-
tract, in accordance with section 1605(a)(1) of the FSIA.297 This solu-
tion could be used along with the statute requiring filing of governmental
activities. United States companies could check the public records to
determine whether or not a particular transaction is seen as governmen-
tal by the foreign country before an agreement is reached. If the activity
is governmental, the company could bargain with the foreign company
for an express waiver of sovereign immunity as to the transaction. Con-
gress is not likely to object to the use of express waivers in this way
because express waivers are already an exception under the FSIA.298
Alternatively, express disclosure could be required. Prior to al-
lowing a sovereign immunity claim, the foreign company would have the
burden of proving that it expressly disclosed to the contracting company
that the activity in question was considered an immune governmental
function. If the foreign company fails to prove a disclosure was made,
the nondisclosure should be construed by the courts as an implied waiver
of sovereign immunity. Congress is not likely to object to the use of im-
plied waivers because such waivers are also excepted from the FSIA.2 99
B. Noncommercial Tort Exception
The provisions of the noncommercial tort exception, like those of
the commercial activity exception, are phrased broadly. Thus, courts are
forced to determine the exception's applicability on a case-by-case basis.
As a consequence, the judicial decisions regarding the noncommercial
297. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(i) provides:
(a) A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the United
States or of the States in any case-(1) in which the foreign state has waived its
immunity either explicitly or by implication, notwithstanding any withdrawal of the
waiver which the foreign state may purport to effect except in accordance with the
terms of the waiver.
298. Id.
299. Id.
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tort exception frequently create confusing and inconsistent standards.
Amendment of the exception should be considered to remedy this prob-
lem. Congress should amend the exception to specify which torts fall
within the noncommercial tort exception. Such specification would help
plaintiffs determine whether to initiate a suit based on the torts commit-
ted by a foreign sovereign. Despite the benefits of a clearly drafted ex-
ception, Congress may not want to amend the exception, in order to
provide the courts discretion to assume jurisdiction over newly emerging
torts.
Congress should also amend the noncommercial tort exception to
clarify what territories are within the jurisdiction of the United States.
Congress needs to specify whether United States embassies and bodies of
waters are territories within the jurisdiction of the United States. Such
amendments are essential because of the varied and inconsistent stan-
dards applied to the interpretation of the FSIA. The Persinger court held
that embassies are within the territorial jurisdiction of the United
States, 3" while the McKeel court held exactly the contrary.0 If a clear,
consistent standard is not enacted, plaintiffs may resort to forum
shopping.
Finally, Congress must enact an attachment or judgment provision
for the noncommercial tort exception, as such a provision exists for the
commercial activity exception under section 1610 of the FSIA.3 2 Cur-
rently, plaintiffs who prevail under the noncommercial tort exception
have no feasible way to enforce their judgments against foreign defend-
ants. Congress enacted the FSIA to allow United States citizens to hold
foreign sovereigns accountable for their tortious actions, especially when
agents of sovereigns cause traffic accidents.30 3 Hence, Congress should
not object to the enactment of a provision that would allow United States
citizens to enforce judgments against foreign sovereigns over which
United States courts have jurisdiction and whom they have found to be
liable on the merits. The only possible objection to such an enforcement
provision would be if it explicitly contradicted an international agree-
ment on the same subject.
300. Persinger v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 729 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1984). See supra notes
164-73 and accompanying text.
301. McKeel v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 722 F.2d 582 (9th Cir. 1983).
302. 28 U.S.C. § 1610.
303. House Report, supra note 2, at 21.
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C. Relationship Between the Commercial Activity and the
Noncommercial Tort Exception
The relationship between the two exceptions has not been clarified
by the courts. Therefore, Congress should clarify the relationship be-
tween these two exceptions in an amendment to the FSIA. Specifically,
Congress should state whether the exceptions are mutually exclusive.
Also, it should specify whether or not a tort specified in subsection
(a)(5)(B) 3 4 of the noncommercial tort exception could be the basis for a
cause of action under the commercial activity exception.
VII. CONCLUSION
Congress enacted the FSIA to establish a consistent, exclusive stan-
dard for the judiciary to determine the applicability of sovereign immu-
nity.30 5 The Act encompasses two major exceptions: the commercial
activity exception and the noncommercial tort exception. De Sanchez
and previous decisions illustrate that the standards for the application of
the exceptions continue to be broad and confusing. Such interpretations
threaten the establishment of restrictive sovereign immunity in the
United States. Prior to the FSIA plaintiffs were at the mercy of State
Department recommendations. These recommendations followed no
consistent pattern of decision-making or precedent." 6 If the FSIA ex-
ceptions are not amended, American plaintiffs seeking relief against for-
eign sovereigns will continue to be victims of inconsistent interpretations
of the FSIA provisions. Inconsistent judicial interpretations will defeat
the very purpose of a statute designed to provide an exclusive standard to
determine the applicablity of the sovereign immunity doctrine.
To reinforce the restrictive sovereign immunity doctrine, Congress
needs to clarify or the courts need to delineate the ambit of the excep-
tions as well as the relationship between them. Congressional amend-
ment would make the courts' application of the exceptions easier and
would inform plaintiffs whether their claims are valid under either or
both of the exceptions. If amendments and clarifications are not made, a
plaintiff may have to resort to remedies outside the Act, such as contrac-
tual waivers. Thus, it is clear that some solution must be found if the
purposes of the FSIA are to be fulfilled. Otherwise, courts may inadver-
tently recreate the same atmosphere of absolute sovereign immunity that
existed prior to the enactment of the FSIA.
304. 28 U.s.c. § 1605(a)(5)(B).
305. House Report, supra note 2, at 12.
306. See supra notes 36-51 and accompanying text.
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